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SETTING PARAMETERS ON THE
MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE:
SOUTH-CENTRAL TIMBER DEVELOPMENT,
INC. v. WUNNICKE
Traditionally, state action affecting interstate commerce is subject to
regulation under the commerce clause.' States affect commerce in two
ways: as market regulators, they prescribe the rules of trade between
private parties;' and, as market participants, they engage in the market
directly as buyers, sellers or employers.' Although the commerce
clause limits states' regulatory activity affecting commerce,4 the
1. The commerce clause states, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall have Power
. To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States .... U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See Note, Commerce Clause-State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Com-
merce Clause Review-Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. IND. AND COM. L.
REv. 893, 897 n.33 (1977).
3. Id. See infra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of state proprietary
functions.
4. Congress regulates interstate commerce in two ways: 1) through legislation, and
2) implication, otherwise termed the dormant commerce clause. J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243-66 (1978). When
state actions affect interstate commerce, the Court employs a balancing test to deter-
mine whether the state's activities survive commerce clause limitations:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could
be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
For cases applying the balancing test, see New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (New Hampshire statute prohibiting exportation of hydro-
electric power without state permission is an undue burden on interstate commerce);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Louisiana health interest
promoted by statute forbidding importation of milk from states not possessing recipro-
cal sales agreement outweighed by burden imposed on milk distributors in states with-
out reciprocity agreement); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona
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Supreme Court, in a recent line of cases,5 exempted states from com-
merce clause limitations when they engaged in the market as partici-
pants. In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,6 the
Court limited a state's ability to use the market-participant exemption
by holding that a state's right to directly7 affect interstate commerce
while engaged in proprietary activities does not extend beyond the
market in which the state is an immediate' participant.
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska re-
quired that state-owned timber receive primary manufacture at in-state
mills prior to export.9 Alaska, neither owning nor operating process-
statute requiring melons to be packed in-state before exportation held an undue burden
on interstate commerce).
5. See, e.g., United Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S.
Ct. 1020 (1984) (state as employer); White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, 460
U.S. 204 (1983) (state as employer); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state as
seller); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state as purchaser).
6. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
7. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text for the distinction between a state's
direct, versus indirect, effect on commerce as a market participant.
8. A state is an immediate participant in markets in which it has an immediate
proprietary interest. For example, South-Central was a participant in the timber-selling
market, but was not a participant in the timber-processing market because it owned no
processing facilities. In South-Central, the Court places restrictions on a state's ability
to impose downstream control over goods in which the state no longer has a proprietary
interest. A state imposes downstream control whenever it directly restricts the free flow
of goods which have passed out of the market in which the state has a proprietary
interest. See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 221 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
In antitrust law, downstream restraints are known as vertical restrictions and are
unlawful. See Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, The Dormant Clause, and State-Owned
Resources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71, 77 n.25 (1980). See also Jefferson County Pharmaceuti-
cal Ass'n. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1105 (1983)
(state, as purchaser of pharmaceuticals for resale in open market, was subject to federal
antitrust law); Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 546 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Miss. 1982)
(state, as operation of lime-crushing plants, was subject to federal antitrust law). But
see Transport Limosine v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Port Author-
ity as market participant not subject to federal antitrust laws).
9. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.115 (1982) grants the Commissioner of the Department
of Natural Resources the power "to determine the timber and other materials to be
sold, and the limitations, conditions, and terms of sale." Pursuant to § 38.05.115, the
Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources promulgated ALASKA ADMIN.
CODE tit. II, § 76.130 (1974) (repealed 1982) (re-authorized at ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
tit. II, §§ 71.230, 71.910 (1982)):
Primary Manufacture: a) The director may require that primary manufacture of
logs, cordwood, bolts or other similar products be accomplished within the State of
Alaska. b) The term primary manufacture means manufacture which is first in
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ing mills, instituted the primary manufacture rule to protect the state's
private timber processing industry."° South-Central Timber Develop-
ment, Inc. purchases and logs timber for export.' South-Central
wanted to purchase Alaskan timber, but the added cost of in-state pri-
mary manufacture made purchase for export impracticable.2 South-
Central challenged Alaska's primary manufacture requirement as a vi-
olation of the commerce clause. 13 Alaska responded that because it
was selling timber, it was acting as a market-participant and could
therefore condition sales of timber upon in-state primary manufacture
without being subject to commerce clause scrutiny. 4 The Supreme
order of time or development. When used in relation to sawmilling, it means 1) the
breakdown process wherein logs have been reduced in size by a headsaw to the
extent that the residual cants, slabs, or planks can be processed by resaw equipment
of the type customarily used in log processing plants; or 2) manufacture of a prod-
uct for use without further processing, such as structural timbers (subject to a firm
showing of an order or orders for this form of product). c) Primary manufacture,
when used in reference to pulp ventures, means the breakdown process to a point
where the wood fibers have been separated. Chips made from timber processing
wastes shall be considered to have received primary manufacture.
The state required the successful bidder to sign a proposed contract, which stated, in
pertinent part: "Section 68. Primary Manufacture. Timber cut under this contract shall
not be transported for primary manufacture outside the State of Alaska without written
approval of the State." 104 S. Ct. at 2239 n. 1 (quoting proposed contract for sale).
10. The Governor of Alaska issued the following policy statement regarding the sale
of timber for primary manufacture:
It is the policy of the State of Alaska to manage the State's forests on a sustained
yield basis; to protect existing industries; to provide for the establishment of new
industries, and to derive revenue from all timber resources. The policy of the State
of Alaska relative to the export and primary manufacture of timber, [is] within the
definition contained in Department Regulations ....
Brief for Petitioner at 31 a, South-Central Timber Development Co. v. Wunnicke, 104 S.
Ct. 2237 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Petitioner].
The federal Government has parallel regulations for timber harvested from national
forests in Alaska:
Unprocessed timber from National Forest System lands in Alaska may not be ex-
ported from the United States or shipped to other States without prior approval of
the Regional Forester. This requirement is necessary to ensure the development
and continued existence of adequate wood processing capacity in that State for the
sustained utilization of timber from the National Forests which are geographically
isolated from other processing facilities.
36 C.F.R. § 223.161 (1984).
11. South-Central Timber Dev. Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2239 (1984).
12. Id. at 2239 n.5.
13. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D.
Alaska 1981).
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2243.
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Court rejected that contention and refused to allow Alaska, a partici-
pant in the timber-selling market, to regulate activity in the timber-
processing market. 5
The Supreme Court has long recognized that states often participate
in the marketplace. 6 Traditionally, states' proprietary activities have
only marginally affected interstate commerce.7 Today, however,
states are expanding their proprietary role,'8 and, as a result, litigation
15. Id. at 2447. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
South-Central progressed through the lower courts on several legal theories. The
district court inferred from dicta in Reeves that the market-participant exemption does
not extend to state proprietary activity involving natural resources. South-Central Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 143 (D. Alaska 1981). See infra note 33
and accompanying text (discussion of the role of natural resources in determining a
market participant exemption). Alaska also argued that because Congress had parallel
primary manufacture requirements for timber taken from federal lands, Congress im-
plicitly consented to Alaska's primary manufacture requirement. 511 F. Supp. at 141.
The district court rejected this argument, holding that Congress must expressly exempt
states from commerce clause restrictions. Id.
The circuit court did not consider the market participant issue. Rather, the court
held that Congress implicitly consented to Alaska's primary manufacture requirement
by virtue of the existence of a parallel federal requirement for timber harvested from
national forests. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 893 (9th
Cir. 1982). The court reasoned that "express authorization is not always necessary.
There will be instances where the federal policy is so clearly delineated that a state may
enact a parallel policy without explicit congressional approval, even if the purpose and
effect of the state law is to favor local interests." Id.
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' finding of implicit consent, noting
that parallel federal and state policies may not be mutually supportive. Congress for-
mulates federal policies with respect to the national interest-each state is represented.
State policy, however, is the product of a single state's needs. 104 S. Ct. at 2292.
Although the Court stated that "there is talismanic significance to the phrase 'expressly
stated,' . . . Congressional intent must be unmistakably clear." Id.
16. Since the turn of the century, the Court has recognized that states engage in
proprietary functions. See, e.g., Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949)
(municipally operated benches); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (state
sales of mineral waters); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state-owned liquor
stores); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (state-owned liquor
stores); Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U.S. 618 (1904) (state as purchaser of
asphalt); Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (state determined labor contract condi-
tions); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affd mem.,
409 U.S. 904 (1972) (state as purchaser of printing services).
17. At the turn of the century, aggregate state expenditures were a relatively minor
fraction of the gross national product (GNP). Even by 1929, state government expendi-
tures accounted for less than seven percent of the GNP. See Melder, The Economics of
Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 127, 139-41 (1940); DEP'T. OF CENSUS, HISTORICAL STA-
TISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES-COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, PART I, p. 230 (1976).
18. In 1976, state and local expenditures rose to 13% of GNP. While aggregate
state expenditures do not show the exact amount spent by all states on proprietary
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol30/iss1/10
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challenging state proprietary activity as a violation of the commerce
clause has become prevalent. 9
The Supreme Court first considered the special relationship of state
proprietary activity to the commerce clause in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp.2" In Alexandria Scrap, Maryland paid a bounty to metal
processors to encourage recycling of scrapped automobiles. The
bounty scheme discriminated against out-of-state metal processors. It
required them to provide more title documentation for automobiles
turned in for bounty than was required of in-state processors. 21 The
Court held that by paying a bounty in return for scrapped automobiles,
Maryland was a purchaser 2 and, thus, was exempt from commerce
clause limitations.23 The Alexandria Scrap Court thus created a mar-
ket-participant exception to the commerce power. That exception per-
activities, data for just 11 states shows that during 1976, $1.017 billion were spent on
proprietary activities. See Comment, In-State Preferences in Public Contracting: States'
Rights Versus Economic Sectionalism, 49 U. COLO. L. Rav. 205, 205-11 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460
U.S. 150, reh'g denied, 460 U.S. 1105 (1983) (state as seller); Western Oil and Gas
Assoc. v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984) (state as landlord); Washington State
Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (state as trash dump
operator); Fidelity Guarantee Mortgage Corp. v. Connecticut Hous. Fin. Auth., 532 F.
Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1982) (state as lender); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.
Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), affid mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (state as purchaser); City of
Phoenix v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 533, 514 P.2d 454 (1973) (state as purchaser);
Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975) (state as em-
ployer); Garden State Daries, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966) (state as
purchaser); American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie, 58 Misc. 2d 1059,
297 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (state as purchaser), modified, 32 A.D.2d 231, 302
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1969).
20. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
21. Id. at 801-03. Alexander, a Virginia scrap processor, claimed that the effect of
this requirement was to burden interstate commerce because in-state hulk suppliers
were now less likely to bring their scrapped automobiles to out-of-state processors. Id.
at 803-04.
22. The Court stated:
[In cases of market regulation] the State interfered with the natural functioning of
the interstate market either through prohibition or through burdensome regula-
tion. By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of [scrapped auto-
mobile] hulks or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it
has entered into the market itself to bid up their price. There has been an impact
upon the interstate flow of hulks only because, since the 1974 amendment, Mary-
land effectively has made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose of
their hulks in Maryland rather than take them outside the state.
Id. at 806.
23. The Court noted that [n]othing in the purposes animating the commerce
clause prohibits a state, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the
1986]
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mitted states trading in the marketplace to decide unilaterally with
whom they wish to deal, regardless of the effect on interstate
commerce.
24
The Court affirmed the market-participant doctrine in Reeves v.
Stake,25 by holding that a state may restrict the sale of state-owned
goods to its residents. In Reeves, North Dakota restricted the sale of
state-produced cement during periods of shortages to residents only.26
Although the Court applied the market-participant doctrine to the
state as a seller, rather than a purchaser, Reeves did not substantially
expand upon the doctrine delineated in Alexandria Scrap.27 Neverthe-
less, Reeves outlined the policies underlying the market-participant
doctrine28 and, in dicta, suggested circumstances that may limit the
doctrine's application.29
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Id. at 810. See
also Note, supra note 2, at 924-25.
24. Justices Brennan, White and Marshall vigorously dissented to the amount of
freedom the majority would allow to states that qualify as market participants. Rather
than categorically exempting states from the strictures of the commerce clause, the dis-
sent would subject all state action affecting interstate commerce to strict scrutiny, ex-
cept that action which allows a state to effectively function in the federal system. 426
U.S. at 817-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissent attacked the majority opinion on a second ground. Commerce clause
limitations on state activities affecting interstate commerce are premised on the policy of
maintaining a national marketplace. By allowing states to enter the market midpoint in
a production stage, they can affect the ultimate distribution of a product for end use.
Alexandra Scrap, 426 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Great Atd. & Pac. Tea
Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976). See also H.P. Hood v. DeMund, 336
U.S. 525, 539 (1949) ("Our system, fostered by the commerce clause, is that [an individ-
ual] shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every niarket in the Nation."); McLead v. Dillworth, 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1940) ("The
very purpose of the commerce clause was to create an area of free trade among the
several states.").
25. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). The Reeves Court stated: "The basic distinction in Alex-
andria Scrap between States as market participants and States as market regulators
makes good sense and sound law." Id. at 436.
26. In Reeves, North Dakota owned and operated a cement manufacturing plant
that sold to buyers in at least nine states. 447 U.S. at 432. Petitioner, a nonresident,
purchased 95% of his cement from North Dakota. Id. In 1978, due to cement
shortages, North Dakota restricted the sale of cement to residents only. Id. at 433.
Petitioner bought suit claiming that North Dakota's restrictive sales policy violated the
commerce clause. Id.
27. The Court stated that the facts of Reeves fit the general rule enunciated in Alex-
andra Scrap better than the facts of Alexandria Scrap itself. See id. at 440.
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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The Reeves Court cited three justifications for exempting states as
market participants from commerce clause regulation: (1) state sover-
eignty,3" (2) state fiduciary responsibility to its residents,31 and (3) a
state's right to engage in private business free from governmental inter-
ference.3 2 The Court suggested, however, that the market-participant
doctrine does not apply when the state-owned "good" in question is a
natural resource 33 or when the state participates in an international
market.34 In these instances, the Court implied that it would scrutinize
30. The Reeves court asserted that courts should not interfere with a state's market
participation if such interference would impair the state's ability to act in its full sover-
eign capacity. 447 U.S. at 438 n. 10. The Court defined the scope of immunity afforded
states through their position as sovereigns in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852 (1976). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985). the Court reaffirmed the power of states to participate in the market,
but abandoned the governmental/proprietary distinction. Id. at 1015-16. Instead, the
Court determined that state sovereignty is protected by state participation in the polit-
ical process. Id. at 1019-20.
Even though the Court will not review a state's proprietary activity, Congress can
regulate such activity by preemption. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. See, e.g., Pirolo v. City
of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, 1008-10 (1983) (federal regulation on noise control super-
sedes state regulation, even though state may be a market participant).
31. The state, to some extent, acts as a trustee for its residents. See, e.g., Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948) (state may ensure development of in-state food
supply); Atkins v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903) (state may restrict work hours
for construction employees working on public contracts).
32. The Court suggested that states acting as market participants should receive the
same rights as private businesses. 447 U.S. at 439.
33. In Reeves, petitioner challenged South Dakota's refusal to sell state-owned ce-
ment, claiming that the state denied nonresidents access to its natural resources. Id. at
443. Although the Court noted that states could not hoard natural resources, it sum-
marily rejected petitioner's argument by holding cement to be a nonnatural, manufac-
tured good. Id. at 444. Other cases reaffirm that state regulation of natural resources is
subject to commerce clause scrutiny. See, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533
(1978) (states cannot prefer residents when distributing its natural resources destined
for interstate commerce). See also Spornhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (hydroe-
lectric power); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (hy-
droelectric power); Huges v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (shrimp); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S.
1 (1928) (shrimp); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925) (grain); Penn-
sylvania V. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); Lemke v. Farmers Grain
Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922) (grain).
The states do, however, have the power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
an important resource. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948).
34. Although not at issue in Reeves, the Court stated that "commerce clause scru-
tiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is alleged."
Reeves v. State, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.9 (1980). See also Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 454 (1979) (California ad valorem property tax, as applied to
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the state's activity closely to determine whether the market-participant
exemption should apply.3"
The dissent in Reeves36 criticized the majority for giving states a free
hand to disrupt interstate commerce merely because they pin on the
"market-participant" label.37 The dissent would subject all state action
affecting interstate commerce to commerce clause scrutiny, except
those actions essential to state sovereignty.38 The dissent feared that
economic balkanization could result from allowing states complete
freedom to prefer residents over nonresidents. Such freedom, the dis-
sent argued, would destroy the national marketplace which the com-
merce clause was designed to protect.39
Three years later, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers," the Supreme Court broadened the range of permissible
state activity under the market-participant doctrine. In White, the City
of Boston required that at least half of the workers on all construction
projects funded, in whole or in part, by city funds, or funds adminis-
tered by the City, be Boston citizens."a The Boston work order effec-
tively regulated employment contracts between private contracting
Japanese shipping companies' cargo containers, held unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 225, 80
Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1969) ("Buy American" statute held subject to commerce clause).
But see K.S.F. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water Supply Comm'n., 75 N.J.
272, 293-302 (1977) ("Buy American" statute held not subject to commerce clause
when state is market participant).
35. 447 U.S. at 438 n.9.
36. Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion; Justices Brennan, White and Ste-
vens joined. 447 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 447-54.
38. The dissent would subject both proprietary and regulatory state activities to
commerce clause scrutiny unless the activities reviewed were integral to maintaining
state sovereignty. The dissent argued that although states may function in the private
sector it is precisely because states are states, with fiduciary and sovereign obligations,
that they "cannot be presumed to act like an enterprise engaged in entirely private
business." Id. at 449-50.
39. 447 U.S. at 453-54. See supra note 24 (discussion of the purposes underlying the
commerce clause).
The dissent feared that states would restrict sales of state-produced commercial ne-
cessities to residents only: "Since the Court's decision contains no limiting principles, a
state will be able to manufacture any commercial product and withhold it from citizens
of other States. This prerogative could extend, for example, to pharmaceutical goods,
food products, or even synthetic or processed energy sources." 447 U.S. at 453 n.6.
40. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
41. Id. at 205 n.1.
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firms and their employees.4" The Court held that even though Boston
did not transact directly with contractors' employees, the city effec-
tively "employed" those working on construction projects because it
ultimately paid for the projects.43 The Court reasoned that the city, as
the "buyer," maintained a proprietary interest in the end product of
the projects and, thus, was a market-participant."
The White decision suggests that state and municipalities can control
the intermediary phases of production of products they have con-
tracted to purchase.45 As long as such state control has a legitimate
relation to a state's proprietary interest-its right to receive an end
product according to contract specifications-its activity is protected
by the market-participant doctrine. Although the White Court recog-
nized that there are limits to state control over parties affected by its
transactions, 46 the Court did not articulate those limits until its deci-
42. Id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. The Court stated: "In this case, the mayor's executive order covers a discrete,
identifiable class of economic activity in which the city is a major participant. Everyone
affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the city.'" Id. at
211 n.7. By labeling Boston a "'construction employer," the Court implied that it is not
the form of the transaction but the substance of a state's involvement in the marketplace
that determines whether the state may avail itself of the market-participant exemption.
Id.
44. Id. at 209.
45. The dissent in White likened state control over parties outside the immediate
transaction to downstream regulation. Id. at 220 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra
note 8 (discussion of downstream control). The dissent distinguished Reeves and Alex-
andria Scrap as cases in which the respective state dealt directly with the parties they
affected. 460 U.S. at 218. On the other hand, "[a]ttempts directly to constrict private
economic choices through contractural conditions are particularly akin to regulation
because, unlike simple refusals to deal with like conventional market regulation, they
threaten to extend their regulatory impact well beyond the transaction in which the
state has an interest. Id, at 220 (Blackmun, J.. dissenting).
In White, Boston did not attempt to regulate downstream by controlling production
after it parted with title, risk of loss or dominion over the goods purchased. Rather,
Boston sought to control production before it received its "goods, while still possessing
a substantial interest in how the goods were produced. Id. at 208-11.
46. Id. at 211 n.7. The majority noted also that state activities shielded from com-
merce clause scrutiny by the market-participant exemption may still be challenged on
other constitutional grounds. Id. at 211. See also United Bldg. and Constr. Trade
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1027-30 (1984) (privileges and immuni-
ties clause may prohibit states from discriminating against nonresidents for state em-
ployment, despite fact that such discrimination is permitted under the market-
participation doctrine); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) ("Alaska Hire"
law discriminating against out-of-state residents on projects involving state-owned re-
sources violative of the privileges and immunities clause); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (state as employer cannot discharge teacher for exercising
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sion in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.47
In South-Central, the Court reaffirmed the general rule of Alexan-
dria Scrap, Reeves and White,48 but drew a boundary for state proprie-
tary activity under the market-participant doctrine.49  Alaska
contended that it was a participant in the timber market 0 and there-
fore, could condition the sale of its timber upon primary manufac-
ture.51 The Court noted, however, that Alaska neither owned nor
operated timber processing plants52 and concluded that, although
Alaska was a participant in the timber-selling market, it was not a par-
ticipant in the timber-processing market. 3 Alaska's requirement that
purchasers process its timber before export was an attempt to control
the purchaser after the state had parted with title, risk of loss and do-
minion over the timber. The Court labeled such attempted control
over timber purchases as downstream 54 regulation and, as such,
outside the boundaries of the market-participant exception. 5
The South-Central Court gave two reasons for disallowing down-
stream restraints. First, the state did not retain a proprietary interest
in the timber after its sale to South-Central.5 6 Second, downstream
restraints are regulatory by nature; their use allows a seller-state to
her right to free speech on issues of public importance); Handsome v. Rutgers Univ.,
445 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.N.J. 1978) (equal protection clause requires state-owned
university to readmit student whose prior school loans were discharged in bankruptcy);
Penthouse Int'l. Ltd. v. Putka, 436 F. Supp. 1220, 1227-30, (N.D. Ohio 1977) (first
amendment protects right to sell Penthouse magazine at newsstand in municipally
owned airport despite the proprietary nature of the airport).
47. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
48. Id. at 2243 (the dormant commerce clause places no limitation on a state's ac-
tivities if the state is acting as a market participaht rather than a market regulator).
49. Id. at 2246-47. ("[The state may not avail itself of the market-participant doc-
trine to immunize its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which
it is not a participant.")
50. Brief for Respondent at 28, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104
S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
51. 104 S. Ct. at 2244. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52. Id. at 2245.
53. Id. at 2246.
54. Id. See supra note 8.
55. South-Central, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
56. Id. Both the doctrine of restraints on alienation and the antitrust laws discour-
age the retention of control over goods after the immediate transaction has occurred.
Id.
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restrict how, or with whom, a purchaser may subsequently deal.5 7
The Court rejected Alaska's contention that it could contractually
bind South-Central to an in-state primary manufacturing require-
ment.5" The Court noted that the commerce clause applies to both
regulatory and contractual activities of states.5 9 The commerce clause
invalidates activities that have a substantial regulatory effect on phases
of a production process outside of the stage in which the state is
participating.'
Instead of contract privity, the Court tied the boundary of permissi-
ble state action to the state's proprietary interest.6" When a state's
proprietary interest ends, so too does its immunity from the commerce
clause.62 In short, the Court maintained that a state could act freely
within the market in which it was participating, but could not attempt
direct control of participants beyond that market. The Court further
cautioned that "markets" must be narrowly defined in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the commerce clause.
63
After defining the boundary for permissible state activity, the Court
distinguished South-Central from Alexandria Scrap, Reeves and
White." The majority demonstrated that in each of the latter cases the
state or municipality was a participant in each market it affected.65 In
Alexandria Scrap, Maryland purchased scrapped automobiles.6 6 In
57. Id.
58. Alaska required purchasers of state-owned timber to agree that timber cut
under contract will not be transported for primary manufacture outside the state. Id. at
2239 n. L
59. Id. at 2245-46.
60. Id. at 2245.
61. The Court stated:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows a State to im-
pose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but al-
lows it to go no further. The State may not impose conditions, whether by statute,
regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market.
104 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2246. The Court reasoned that "[u]nless the 'market' is relatively nar-
rowly defined, the doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule that states may
not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce even if they act with the permis-
sible state purpose of fostering local industry." Id.
64. Id. at 2243-46.
65. Id.
66. 426 U.S. 794, 801-03 (1976).
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Reeves, North Dakota sold cement.67 In White, the city acted as an
employer.68 The Court detailed the distinction between White and
South-Central. In White, the City of Boston did not attempt to regu-
late downstream; rather, it sought to control the production process
while it still possessed a substantial proprietary interest in the goods
produced.69 The city had not relinquished dominion and control over
the end product. In contrast, South-Central presented a situation in
which Alaska attempted to control the manner in which purchasers
could dispose of timber after it was brought from the state. Alaska
possessed no proprietary interest in the timber. Because Alaska's pri-
mary manufacture regulations attempted to control markets beyond
the one in which it was participating, the Court subjected the state's
regulations to strict commerce clause scrutiny.7°
The dissent in South-Central7' argued that the distinction between
states as market participants and states as market regulators72 was
more apparent than real. The dissent could not find a distinction be-
tween White, in which Boston regulated employment, and South-Cen-
tral, in which Alaska regulated timber.73 Further, the dissent believed
the market-participant doctrine to be an exercise in formalism, 74 argu-
ing that Alaska could have regulated South-Central's activities by de-
veloping a subsidy program, as the State of Maryland did in
Alexandria Scrap, or by restricting sales of timber to in-state residents,
as North Dakota did in Reeves.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent makes a significant point. If states are
allowed to conduct their activities under the guise of the market-par-
ticipant doctrine, they will be able to remove themselves from com-
merce clause scrutiny altogether. States desiring to regulate commerce
67. 447 U.S. 429, 433 (1980).
68. 460 U.S. 204, 205 (1983).
69. 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (1984).
70. Because Alaska did not qualify for the market-participant exemption, the Court
analyzed the case under traditional commerce clause scrutiny. Applying the balancing
test of Pike, see supra note 4, the Court held that Alaska's absolute ban on the export of
unprocessed timber fell almost within the rule of per se invalidity, 104 S. Ct. at 2247.
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. For the distinction between market-participant and market-regulator, see supra
notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
73. 104 S. Ct. 2248-49.
74. Id. at 2248.
75. Id. at 2249. But see supra note 33 (explaining that timber and other natural
resources may not come under the ambit of the market-participant doctrine).
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in a particular market simply could become marginal participants in
that market, expending little through subsidies and bounties, while re-
directing the flow of interstate commerce.76 The purposes that animate
the commerce clause-free trade and the promotion of a national mar-
ket place-would thereby be circumvented.77
The dissent in South-Central had no difficulty with the anomalous
regulatory license granted to states under the market-participant doc-
trine, but the Reeves dissent did.7' The dissent in Reeves asserted that
the only way to safeguard the national marketplace from state domina-
tion was by subjecting all state activity affecting commerce to com-
merce clause scrutiny.79 Given the present state of the market-
participant doctrine, the Reeves dissent is correct.
The South-Central Court attempted to restrict the applicability of
the market-participant exemption to markets in which the state action
is an active and immediate participant.8 0 It went only halfway.
Although the Court forbade states from directly"1 influencing markets
in which they were not participants, the Court made no attempt to
limit states' efforts to indirectly8 2 influence downstream markets. For
example, in Alexandria Scrap, Maryland legitimately redirected the
flow of scrapped autos through its participation in the scrapped auto
market. Maryland, however, might also have indirectly affected other
76. For example:
[A] state, particularly in times of high unemployment, will be tempted to act in its
purchasing capacity to pay a small bounty for goods produced in-state and thereby
purposefully redirect interstate commerce away from ore efficient out-of-state pro-
ducers to the "purchasing" state in order to increase employment in the state and
to broaden its tax base .... This effect will result in damaging the economies of
other states not having similar programs.
Note, supra note 2, at 924-25.
77. But see supra note 23.
78. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 447-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. See also text accompanying notes 59-60. 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46.
81 The Court does not articulate its holding in terms of direct or indirect effects on
commerce. Nevertheless, the South-Central Court revoked a regulation that directly
attempted to control downstream markets. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text. The language of the opinion also refers only to direct burdens on commerce: "The
State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a
regulatory effect outside of that particular market. 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46 (emphasis
added).
82. A state indirectly affects commerce by rerouting the flow of goods during an
intermediary phase of production so as to cause a change in the final production
process.
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markets. By causing a concentration of scrap metal to be located in
Maryland, out-of-state purchasers of such scrap metal might have ex-
perienced a higher average purchasing cost for the metal. Concomi-
tantly, the availability of a larger supply of scrap metal to in-state users
might have allowed them to purchase it at a lower average cost.83 The
Court's acquiescence to indirect downstream control, implicit in the
rules of Alexandria Scrap,84 remains.
The South Central Court did, however, embrace dicta 5 in Reeves
that suggested the market-paticipant doctrine may not apply when
states seek to affect the interstate flow of natural resources8 6 or when
states participate in an international market.8 7 Because the Court
found Alaska's activities outside of the market participant doctrine,88
however, it did not apply the Reeves dicta.
The South-Central Court attempted to limit the effect of state propri-
etary activity to the specific market in which the state participates.
The South-Central rule falls short of accomplishing this. Under the
rule, states not only can directly affect the market in which they par-
ticipate, but can also indirectly affect commerce downstream. It is con-
ceivable that, in some instances, the indirect effects of state action
could be more repugnant to the maintenance of a national marketplace
than direct actions. If a cure for the indirect effects of state action can
be accomplished only by eliminating direct state market-participatory
action, anomalous applications of the market-participant doctrine will
result.
8 9
The South-Central Court recognized the need to narrow the zone of
83. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 824-26 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 806. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
85. 104 S. Ct. at 2237.
86. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 (1980). See also supra note 33.
87. Id. at 438 n.9. See also supra note 34.
88. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
89. In Smith v. Dep't. of Agriculture, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), the circuit
court reviewed a fact pattern identical to Reeves, but held the state's actions nonproprie-
tary.
The state, in Smith, owned display facilites for produce sellers and contributed funds
for running a state fair. Id. at 1082. The state assigned choice selling locations to resi-
dent produce sellers. Id. Nonresidents were assigned to inferior selling locations, and,
as a result, sold much less than they could have in a choice location. Id. The state
asserted that it was a participant to the display-renting market. Id. at 1084. The court
rejected this contention and held the state to be regulating the produce-selling market.
Id. at 1085. In reality, the state was indirectly regulating the produce-selling market, a
result allowed under the rule of Alexandria Scrap.
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permissible state activity under the market-participant doctrine and,
therefore, prohibited direct downstream regulation. At present, how-
ever, states still have the power to regulate downstream indirectly. In
order to preserve the efficacy of the commerce clause, the Court needs
to further restrict states' abilities to affect remote markets under the
market-participant doctrine.
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